

## Introduction

### I. There and Back Again: a Word about Method

At the end of Book VI of Plato's *Republic*, Socrates provides the second of three images in an attempt to convey to his interlocutors something of the meaning of "the Good, the True, and the Beautiful." As in the final figure he imagines (that of the Cave), in the image of the Divided Line, Socrates has in mind something of a process, a movement, a journey of the mind. It is as if he wants his interlocutors within the dialogue (just as Plato wants his readers) to begin at the bottom of the line, and then move up through the successive elements or segments of the line, up to the point of ultimate knowing, simultaneously the point of ultimate being. Now, the four stages or phases or segments on the line (from the bottom to the top) are as follows: *eikasia*, *pistis*, *dianoia*, and *noêsis*. I understand these, respectively, as:

1. the reception of images by means of visual sense perception, and the concomitant grasping of such images by the mind;
2. the trust, or faith, that these images, now perceived in the mind, are actually real objects in the world;<sup>1</sup>
3. reasoning, or the process of taking various elements received in the first two phases, and "putting them together" (and "taking them apart") in various logical ways that, in the context of some kind of argumentation, fruitfully generate demonstrable conclusions;
4. ultimate recognition: *Noêsis*, from the Greek word for mind, *nous*, is distinct from reasoning (*dianoia*) in that it not a process of synthesis and analysis. Rather, it is the *result* of the latter, and as such it is a simple *beholding*. It is a restful gaze, a *comprehensive* vision of some object of the mind, a beholding that is possible only because the intellectual labor of the previous stages has been completed.

Now, what is going on here, in this image of the Divided Line? What is Plato getting at? It is not so much that he is simply advocating a method of investigation or discovery. It's not, that is,

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<sup>1</sup> Philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis calls this trust "ontological assuredness." Cornelius Castoriadis, "The Discovery of Imagination," in *World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and Imagination*, trans. David Ames Curtis (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997), 218. Closely related is William Desmond's "preobjective community of mindfulness and being." See William Desmond, "Being, Determination, and Dialectic: on the Sources of Metaphysical Thinking," *the Review of Metaphysics* 48, no. 4 (June 1995): 762. This phrase of Desmond's also occurs in the reproduction of the above text in *The William Desmond Reader*, ed. Christopher Ben Simpson (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 2012), 3–4, at 3.

as if he is saying, “If you want to grow in your knowledge, then you should implement this method.” Rather, it’s more as if he is providing a *description* of how the human mind works, how it functions, given (what seems to be) its structure, or the structure of knowing. Put philosophically, one can say that in this image of the Divided Line, Plato is giving a phenomenological description of how human knowing occurs. We don’t have to *try* to think this way, any more than we have to try to open up our mouths and speak (for example, when one needs someone’s help to accomplish some task), any more than we have to *try* to eat (or to chew food) when we are physically hungry. And yet, even though he is not, strictly speaking, advocating a philosophical method *per se*, still, attentiveness to the structure of this process can open up new vistas for improving one’s approach to philosophical investigation. There is great benefit in “laying bare” the structure of human thought, as Plato does here, for the journey of growing in (self-)awareness.

One of the most important structural features which the Divided Line lays bare—centuries of subsequent philosophical and theological tradition allow one retrospectively to see this—is that the final moment in the schema is a kind of return to the first—or, to the first *two*, taken together as a whole. One can, that is, take the first two moments of *eikasia* and *pistis* together such that, as a total unit, they constitute the actual “grasping” or apprehension of real objects in the world. One could regard this composite unity as “moment one.” “Moment two,” then, would be the process of *dianoia*, the time-laden process of moving serially through individual elements, taking them together and possibly (at a later stage) taking them apart. (Thomas Aquinas calls this activity *componere et dividere*.) Each of these earlier stages, however, is directed to the final moment, the third phase, of the entire process: *noêsis*, the simple (intellectual) beholding of some object of the mind. But the important point for our purposes here is to see how this final moment is a “return” to, a kind of recapitulation of, the first moment. The sense perception of sight is the visual grasping or recognition of an object: unlike a time-laden process it takes place in a sudden flash of insight, in “one fell swoop.” Such is the case as well for the final moment in the line. *Noêsis*, for Plato (and Platonists all stripes who include themselves in the tradition he inaugurated), is a kind of intellectual grasping, a kind of beholding. It is not a movement through a series of elements, but rather, it is a restful gaze before some intellectual vision. In this regard, it is like that initial moment of visual perception, but *more so*. It is a kind of repetition of the initial moment, but on a higher plane.

In another of Plato's dialogues, this one much shorter than the *Republic*, we sense a similar resonance. In the *Meno* we find ourselves listening in on a conversation, a dialogue, among three characters (so, really, it is more of a "trialogue"). Meno, a friend of Socrates, is conversing, together with Socrates, with Meno's unnamed slave boy. Socrates (the protagonist in virtually all of Plato's dialogues, including this one) has set up this somewhat staged conversation between Meno and his slave in order to demonstrate a point, a point about *memory*. Socrates is attempting to "lay bare" a paradoxical feature of human knowing. As he and Meno converse with the slave boy, they are able to lead him down a path, by means of questions and answers, of "discovering" the mathematical truth of the Pythagorean theorem, although here discovery is actually a kind of remembering. Through a series of questions, they prompt their erstwhile student to *realize* the answers *for himself*, including the ultimate conclusion that, "given a square whose sides are two units long and so whose area is four square units, the square on the diagonal is obviously twice as big."<sup>2</sup> Socrates and Meno never tell the slave boy the answer (or answers); they elicit the knowledge *from* him.<sup>3</sup>

Plato is wanting us to see that, at some level, the slave boy *had already known* the answer all along. He already "knew" it in his memory, Plato thinks, and this act of recollecting the truth is what Plato (together with the tradition which follows in his wake) calls *anamnesis*. Perhaps an example from the author's personal experience is apt here: when I teach the *Meno* in undergraduate philosophy courses, I usually put the point like this: "In order to learn something new, to make a true discovery, one must neither already know the thing fully, nor be *completely* ignorant of the thing." In other words, one must begin with a preliminary, inchoate glimpse of the final object. One subsequently achieves the final recognition through the process of *anamnesis*, in which knowledge is "drawn out" of the student by his dialoging interlocutors.<sup>4</sup> But the real point, for our purposes, is that, here again, what we find at the final stage of the process is a kind of *repetition* of the initial element, but on a higher plane. After a process of recollection,

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<sup>2</sup> Robert Seely, "Plato's Meno: the Geometry," John Abbot College Math Department, accessed August 29, 2018, <http://www.math.mcgill.ca/rags/JAC/124/meno.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, *Meno*, in *Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett: 2002).

<sup>4</sup> The etymology of the English word "education" is telling: the Latin *educatio* (originally *exducatio*, from the verb *educare* or *exduco*) is literally a "drawing out." In his role of "drawing out" knowledge from his interlocutors, Socrates acts as a "midwife" (*maia*). See Seth Benardete, *Plato's Theaetetus: Part I of The Being of the Beautiful* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1986), I.11–I.13 (lines 149–50). Hence philosophers sometimes refer to Socrates' activity as *maieutic*.

which—as a kind of *dianoia*—is best done in dialogue with others, one arrives at a fuller version of what one already had, albeit in a preliminary, inchoate way, at the beginning.

Insofar as these first two paradigms we have considered bear the structure A—B—A' (where the initial element is repeated at the end, but in a nonidentical manner) we can say that they are structurally identical to the Neoplatonic pattern of *exitus et reditus*—which Joseph Ratzinger, in his *Habilitationsschrift* on St. Bonaventure, labels “egressus und regressus”<sup>5</sup>—the pattern of “exit and return” which characterizes much Neoplatonic thought.<sup>6</sup>

This same structure is articulated in a postmodern context as well, in the work of Hans Georg Gadamer. Gadamer’s notion of the hermeneutic circle also enshrines this movement from initial glimpse to final (though always provisional) intellectual—or hermeneutic—vision.<sup>7</sup>

As we will see later in our study, premodern divine illumination theory, often associated with the Augustinian tradition, also bears this same structure. Even in the realm of natural reason—quite distinct from the dynamics of faith—one can, according to this tradition, know things in the world only through some kind pre-given insight, some kind of pre-given conceptuality. On the broad highway that is the tradition of Christian Neoplatonism—including the thought of St. Bonaventure—this insight is articulated in terms of *light*. And, here again, what we find at the beginning, light, is also the ultimate end point of the human pilgrimage of the mind: the luminous (and ineffable) beholding of the “essence” of God in the beatific vision. And yet this vision of ultimate reality cannot be achieved until after one has gone through an intellectual and spiritual process which prepares the spectator for this vision, which, for this tradition, is the ultimate *telos* of all human existence.

Allow me to attempt to apply this tripartite schema, distilled through the history of philosophy, to this essay. In it the method I try to employ is consistent with all of the above scenarios (Plato’s Divided Line, Meno’s Paradox, Gadamerian hermeneutics, and Christian

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<sup>5</sup> Joseph Ratzinger, “Die Geschichtstheologie des heiligen Bonaventura” in *Offenbarungsverständnis und Geschichtstheologie Bonaventuras*, Joseph Ratzinger Gesammelte Schriften 2, ed. Gerhard Ludwig Müller, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2009), 619. This text is included in *Band 2* of the *Gesammelte Schriften* and in 1959 was accepted as the final form of, and published as, the young Ratzinger’s *Habilitationsschrift*: “Die Geschichtstheologie des heiligen Bonaventura.” This portion of *Band 2* (including the forewords of the various editions as well as various supplements at the end) is comprised by pages 419–659.

<sup>6</sup> On the prominence of the pattern of “exit and return” in ancient neoplatonism, see Andrew Louth, *The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007) 152–8. Cf. Peter Candler, *Theology, Rhetoric, and Manuduction, or, Reading Scripture Together on the Path to God* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006) 44–5.

<sup>7</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1990), 265–71.

neoplatonist divine illumination theory). Again, we find in them the basis for the following schematic:

1. Some kind of primordial glimpse, or recognition, of an object, given in advance (“always already there”), often hazy and vague. The name which I give to this activity/performance/power of the soul is first *intellectus*.
2. A process of investigation involving multiple, intertwined dimensions of struggle and growth: on the intellectual level there is the work of *dianoia* which involves the analysis of relationships among various logical and discursive units; on the appetitive/moral/ethical/existential level there is the need for some kind of purification (for Aristotle, this is moral virtue; for Bonaventure and Ratzinger, this is a kind of sanctified, or “graced,” moral virtue which can be called “holiness”). Through this process, one is prepared for the third and final moment.
3. On the “far side” of this process of growth, one finally arrives at a second, more full instance of recognition. For Plato it is *noêsis*. For Gadamer it is an interpretation (always provisional, but always closer to the truth than previous iterations) in which two cultural, historical horizons are merged. For Bonaventure and others (in certain streams of the Christian tradition, especially in the Middle Ages), it is called, in its ultimate form, the beatific vision, and it is accompanied not just by holiness but, for Bonaventure, also by full, mystical *sapientia*. I call this mode of existence, a kind of return to the first moment (since both are instances of recognition, or pure beholding), “final *intellectus*.”

In what I take to be a Gadamerian vein, I have applied this method in this essay. At an early stage in my reading of Ratzinger’s *Habilitationsschrift*, I had a hazy glimpse, due to his emphasis on the story of the salvation of God’s people, that the notion of *mythos* or narrative might cast a powerful light on his reading of Bonaventure’s *Hexaëmeron*. As I studied and meditated on the primary, baseline story which Bonaventure interprets in the work—the days (or “visions”) of creation as narrated in the first chapter of Genesis—I discerned there the same pattern as is embodied in Plato’s Divided Line.<sup>8</sup> The first two days collapse into a single, initial moment; the middle moment (day three) constitutes a process of psychical growth, both intellectual and appetitive; the final moment (day four) is a kind of recapitulation of the first, but

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<sup>8</sup> As we will see below, Bonaventure never completed his (allegedly planned) treatment of the six days of creation, but dealt instead only with the first four. It is his treatment of these first four days, then, which I claim bears the same structure as the four segments in Plato’s Divided Line.

on a higher plane. The discernment of this shared pattern then led me to investigate the structure of narrative itself, at the most fundamental level possible. While Gadamer's hermeneutic circle—bearing the same tri-partite structure as is outlined above—is applicable to narrative analysis, Paul Ricœur's narratology invites us to see history itself as a narrative, and so it, too, shares this same structure. Working backwards, then, my basic argument in this essay is:

1. History is narrational: it is a special case of narrative.
2. Narrative interpretation<sup>9</sup> shares the pattern A—B—A'.
3. In its interpretation of the days of creation, Bonaventure's *Hexaëmeron* embodies this same pattern.
4. Ratzinger rightly sees history (or historiology) as fundamental to Bonaventure's critique of Aristotelianism, as contained in the *Hexaëmeron*.

Conclusion: Narrative (or *mythos*, or story) provides a conceptually powerful tool for analyzing Bonaventure's *Hexaëmeron*.

This essay is an argument for, and an exploration of the implications of, this conclusion. In the mode of exploration thereof, I suggest a fundamental reason why philosophy is dependent upon theology, having to do with history, and therefore, with time.

## II. Preliminary Outline.

Let us turn, then, to an initial presentation of the overall shape of this essay. At the broadest level its structure (not including this present introduction) is as follows:

- Chapter 1: the *Sitz im Leben* of each thinker (Bonaventure and Ratzinger).
- Chapter 2: the Aristotelian positioning of narrative *poiêsis* in relation to two other modes of discourse: science and history. As a discourse in between, *mythos* metaxologically mediates the difference between *epistêmê* and *historia*.
- Chapter 3: the structural position of *intellectus* in the work of Bonaventure and Ratzinger, and its connection to narrative or *mythos*.
- Chapter 4: the role of desire, or affective disposition, in Bonaventure and Ratzinger, and its connection to narrative or *mythos*.
- Chapter 5: the narrational interpenetration of mind or thought, on the one hand, and history on the other, in Bonaventure and Ratzinger.

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<sup>9</sup> Following Jacques Derrida, I hold that there is no such thing as an uninterpreted narrative. As we will see below, Ratzinger's notion of revelation manifests a similar instinct.

- Conclusion: final intellect as cosmic, beatified *sapientia*. As a discipline in between, theology mediates the difference between mythos (history is always mythos) and philosophy.

In order for this “macro-outline” to be clear, however, I first must clarify several great themes which dominate the argument: *mythos*/story/narrative; the trans-epochal manifestation of “science” in Aristotle’s antiquity (*epistême*), in Bonaventure’s epoch of the thirteenth century (scholastic, systematic *scientia*), and in the modern period in which Ratzinger worked; the prominence of the pattern of “exit and return”; the philosophical importance of desire; history (and time) as the life-blood of theology.

### III. Introduction of Key Themes.

To these respective themes, then, we now turn.

#### • *Mythos*/story/narrative

No theme is more crucial to this essay than that of *mythos*—a term which I will use synonymously with “narrative” and “story”—but in order to introduce this notion, instead of attempting some airtight definition, I will put forth four constitutive traits of this central notion, utilizing the work of four respective thinkers to that end: Aristotle, C.S. Lewis, Paul Ricœur, and Roger Fowler.

In his *Poetics*, a work attempting to elucidate the nature of ancient Greek tragedy, Aristotle lists several elements constitutive of ancient Greek tragedy which can fruitfully be applied to the phenomenon of narrative or story. These elements include: plot (*mythos*), *dianoia* (thought), character (*êthos*), dialogue performed by the characters (*lexis*), recognition of the resolution of the plot (*anagnorisis*), and suffering (*pathos*) and catharsis on the part of an audience member, a character, and/or a chorus member.<sup>10</sup>

As numerous commentators on the *Poetics* as well as theorists working in the field of narratology have noticed, Aristotle’s term *mythos* as it is used in that work frequently denotes the notion of *plot*, or “the putting together of events.”<sup>11</sup> That is, it is one of several “narrative

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<sup>10</sup> I associate *pathos* and catharsis because, unique among these elements which Aristotle lists, their nature is to engage the human being at the emotional or affective level. These constitutive elements are listed and elaborated on in Book 6 of the *Poetics*. Aristotle, *On Poetics*, trans. Seth Benardete and Michael Davis (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2002), 1449b21–1450b21.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 1450a 5. Greek συνηθισιν των πραγματων. See Aristotle, *On Poetics*, ed. R. Kassel, in Perseus Digital Library, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0055%3Asection%3D1450a>

elements” (those listed above) which together constitute that cultural production, that mode of *poiêsis*, which Aristotle calls “tragedy” and which we may extend to include other verbal/written genre as well.<sup>12</sup> Following Aristotle, I see plot as playing a more foregrounded role than any of the other elements. It enjoys a privileged position within tragedy and other narrative forms, precisely as the “putting together of events” (as distinguished from the dianoetic “thought” or interpretation or meaning of these events). And yet, even in the *Poetics*—though also true in other of his works—the Stagirite *also* uses *mythos* in a broader sense, generally to mean *story* or *tale*.<sup>13</sup>

An especially conspicuous instance of “*mythos*” as story occurs at line 1449b 5:

The making of stories came on the one hand from the beginning from Sicily, but of those in Athens, Crates was the first to make speeches and stories of a general character once he discarded the form of the lampoon.<sup>14</sup>

Here we encounter a usage of “*mythos*” in the context of a discussion of various subtypes, all within the same class of *mythos*, including comedy, tragedy, and lampoon. Hence it is clear that, for Aristotle, that cultural production called “tragedy” is an instance of the larger mode *poiêsis* which is referred to by the term “*mythos*.” Tragedy, for Aristotle, is a subclass of *mythos*.

Additionally, as is indicated by his use of *pathos* as one of the constitutive elements of tragedy listed above, Aristotle sees a close connection between *mythos* and the realm of human emotion or—to employ a term traditionally associated with the human register of emotion—passion. Aristotle is not alone in recognizing this additional trait; it is shared by the twentieth-century classical critic C. S. Lewis, as well. The connection between narrative production and human affect is so important, so constitutive of the nature of story or *mythos*, that it merits expanded comment, even here at this introductory stage.

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(accessed November 20, 2018). See the use of this phrase by Benardete and Davis in Aristotle, *On Poetics*, 19–24, especially. footnote 55.

<sup>12</sup> We may extend the discussion beyond that of tragedy, since Aristotle himself extends the discussion, in the *Poetics* itself, to epic poetry in general and Homer in particular, applying various of these elements to those works as well. Numerous references to Homer are distributed throughout the work.

<sup>13</sup> For three such usages of *mythos* (in various grammatical declensions), occurring within 30 lines of each other, see Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1449a 20–1449b 10.

<sup>14</sup> Aristotle, *On Poetics*, tr. Benardete and Davis, 1449b 5–9.

In his essay “Myth Become Fact,” Lewis contrasts the contents of myth—which he never defines but which he does exemplify by reference to “Orpheus and Eurydice”—with the contents of abstract concepts. “In the enjoyment of a great myth we come nearest to experiencing as a concrete what can otherwise be understood only as an abstraction.”<sup>15</sup> Of import here is the ability of myth to provoke a concrete experience in the reader or audience member, a concrete experience which is the opposite of an abstract concept, such as the proper predicate of the middle premise of an Aristotelian syllogism or a mathematical theorem (such as the Pythagorean theorem of Plato’s *Meno*). For Lewis, then, myth is “concrete” not only in the sense that it utilizes images provoked in the imagination, but also as the stimulant of an (emotional) experience (such as *pathos* or *catharsis*) in the reader/hearer, an experience which may be regarded as a particular, embodied, material/physical event or object.

The third highlighted trait of *mythos* for the purpose of this essay, in addition to plot and provocation of affect, comes from the thought of twentieth-century, Christian, continental philosopher and literary theorist Paul Ricœur. In his essay “Time and Narrativity,” Ricoeur elaborates various ways in which narrative—both fictional and historical—participates in what the modern hermeneutic tradition—of which Ricœur is a participant—calls “the hermeneutic circle.”<sup>16</sup> In its very essence, that is, narrative—or narrative interpretation—is characterized by the same structure alluded to above in this introduction: the threefold pattern of the initial grasp, the process of putting together elements and taking them apart in various ways, and the final vision of the whole story in its entirety, now at a fuller level of completion.

Fourth and finally, Roger Fowler, in his essay “Mythos and Logos,” takes us one step further down the road toward arriving at preliminary grasp of *mythos* and its importance for this essay, for he contrasts it historically with the notion of *logos*. Impressively, Fowler performs this contrast in the mode of a historical genealogy of the relationship between these two discourses, or the historical development which he calls “demythologization.” Somewhere between the self-styled myth smashers of modernity (one thinks of the German-inspired historical-critical method of biblical interpretation, together with its associated names ranging from Reimarus and Wrede, through Weiss, to Schweizer and Bultmann) on the one hand, and the myth extollers of postmodern relativism, Fowler cautions against both extremes. Indeed, his position is close to

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<sup>15</sup> C.S. Lewis, “Myth Become Fact,” in *God in the Dock*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972), 63–67, at 66.

<sup>16</sup> Paul Ricœur, “The Human Experience of Time and Narrative,” in *A Ricœur Reader: Reflection and Imagination*, ed. Mario J. Valdés (Toronto: the Univ. of Toronto Press, 1991), 99–116.

that of Plato's Socrates, who critically purges *mythos* of its irrational elements, while at the same time "mixing" it into the warp and woof of *bona fide* philosophy, recognizing all the while the latter's dependence upon the former.<sup>17</sup> For Fowler as for Plato, then, after the dust settles from the project of proper demythologization, we are still confronted by the enduring presence of *mythos*, and this is true even *in spite of* the false "progress myth" of secular modernity.<sup>18</sup> *Mythos*, then, needs *logos*; the two stand in a primordial, fecund, and symbiotic relationship of dialectic.

These four traits, then, "mark" my use of *mythos* in this essay: the centrality of plot (Aristotle); the connection with human affect (Lewis); the hermeneutic circularity (Ricoeur); and the dialectical relationship with *logos*. These distinctives should suffice at this early stage.

#### • The historical manifestations of "science"

In the second place, it behooves us to consider in a preliminary way another form of discourse which historically functions alongside that of myth. Science is that body of knowledge which counts as the pinnacle of *logos*, alluded to above. This is true, first and foremost, for Plato and Aristotle. In Plato's early dialogue *Euthyphro*, his protagonist Socrates describes *epistêmê*, by appeal to the mythological sculptor demigod Daedalus, as knowledge which is "tied down": unlike the roving figurines crafted by Daedalus (magically possessing the ability to move around) true knowledge for Socrates is secured by solid reasons and argumentation.<sup>19</sup> Plato's disciple Aristotle, "the first systematic philosopher of science in the West,"<sup>20</sup> takes this initial description and imbues it with impressive rigor. For him *epistêmê* is a genuine grasp of causes, coupled with the conceptually airtight relations of entailment which hold in his full-fledged system of deduction (itself built on a foundation of inductive research), as theoretically articulated in the *Posterior Analytics* and as applied in, among other works, the *Metaphysics*.

By the time of Bonaventure's thirteenth-century milieu at the University of Paris (shared with his confrere, more friendly to the Aristotelian vision of rigorous *scientia*, the Dominican friar Thomas Aquinas), of special note is the *re-emergence* of Aristotelian influence in the Latin-speaking West, after centuries of dominance by the tradition of Christian Neoplatonism, most influentially expounded by St. Augustine of Hippo. This Augustinian tradition, while rigorous in

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<sup>17</sup> For an insightful treatment of Plato's stance with respect to myth, see Josef Pieper, *Divine Madness: Plato's Case Against Secular Humanism*, trans. Lothar Krauth (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995).

<sup>18</sup> Roger Fowler, "Mythos and Logos," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 131 (2011): 45–66.

<sup>19</sup> Plato, *Euthyphro*, in *Five Dialogues*, trans. G.M.A. Grube, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., 1-20 (Indianapolis: Hackett: 2002), 11c–11e.

<sup>20</sup> Paul Feyerabend, "History of the Philosophy of Science," in *The Oxford Guide to Philosophy*, ed. Ted Honderich (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005), 849–52, at 850.

its own way, lent itself to the kind of devotional “monastic theology” typified, for example, by Bernard of Clairveaux.<sup>21</sup> By Bonaventure’s day, the re-emergence of Aristotle, including the so-called *logica nova* (far more expansive than the *Categories*, besides *On Interpretation* the only extant Aristotelian logical work in the West until the mid- to late twelfth century) had won the minds (and captured the imaginations) of significant contingencies, notably the arts faculty of the University of Paris. Even theologians such as Thomas were enamored with this recent arrival of conceptually rigorous rationality, the stage of which had already been set by independent developments toward scientific discourse, including the new technologies of knowledge developed and deployed by the massively influential *Book of Sentences* of Peter Lombard.<sup>22</sup> Thanks in part to Lombard’s four-part tome, by the thirteenth century biblical and theological thought was—at least in some quarters—thoroughly incorporated into scientific discourse (at least in the minds of many).<sup>23</sup>

While I firmly agree with with Ratzinger’s claim that the specific motive of Bonaventure’s anti-Aristotelianism is not simply some anti-scientific bent on Bonaventure’s part, it is nevertheless clear from even a cursory reading of the *Hexaëmeron* that for the Seraphic Doctor, rigorous *scientia* is merely a means to a much greater end: the full-orbed *sapientia* which engages the holistic dimensionality of our humanity. Hence on the very first page of his *Habilitationsschrift* Ratzinger frames the entire work in terms of Bonaventure’s relation to science: after returning from his retreat on Mt. Alverna in 1259, Bonaventure returned to the university community “as an outsider to point out the limits of science from the perspective of faith.”<sup>24</sup> Indeed, Bonaventure’s sustained and passionate emphasis on mystical wisdom stands in a relationship of entrenched tension with the thoroughgoing, science-based Aristotelianism of his day. For him rigorous science is neither the last word nor the highest discourse.

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<sup>21</sup> On the distinction between “scholastic theology” and “monastic theology,” see Jean Leclercq, *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God*, trans. Catharine Misrahi (New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 1982).

<sup>22</sup> Philipp Rosemann, *Peter Lombard* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), 54–70; Philipp Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 2007).

<sup>23</sup> Philipp Rosemann shows how Bonaventure’s contemporary, Thomas Aquinas, develops the proto-systematic *Book of Sentences*, which still “sticks closely” to the narrative flow of Scripture in important ways, in a more scientific direction. Thomas takes himself, that is, to transform the material of the *Sentences* into the more appropriate (in his view) form of *scientia divina*. See Philipp Rosemann, “*Sacra Pagina* or *Scientia Divina*? Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, and the Nature of the Theological Project,” in *Thomas Aquinas: Teacher and Scholar, the Aquinas Lectures at Maynooth, volume 2:2002-2010*, ed. James McEvoy, Michael W. Dunne, and Julia Hynes (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012), 56–61.

<sup>24</sup> Joseph Ratzinger, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, trans. Zachary Hayes, O.F.M. (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1989), 1.

For all this contextualization of Bonaventure vis-à-vis the scientific culture of his day, however, he is not alone in staking out a contrapuntal relation to that one-dimensional discourse. Joseph Ratzinger, some seven centuries later, charts a similar course, in a similar context, and for similar reasons. In the high tide of twentieth-century European modernity, however, the precise character of science has morphed yet again. In the hands of such Enlightenment thinkers as Kepler, Bacon, Newton, and Kant, the register of scientific inquiry shifted dramatically to the domain of the empirical, in contrast to the posture of Aristotle. Of particular importance in this shift is the new emphasis on experimental repeatability, or what Ratzinger calls “the *faciendum*.”<sup>25</sup>

In the wake of the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century, meanwhile, during which time the sound interpretation of sacred texts (and, by extension, political and legal texts) was becoming a pressing need in the lives of individual Christians, a new discipline, that of hermeneutics, began to emerge in Europe. Beginning with Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), this discipline which emphasized *meaning* over “fact” began to feel the need to define itself in contradistinction to modern natural science. Working in this hermeneutic tradition Edmund Husserl and Wilhelm Dilthey attempted to ground hermeneutics in a strict methodology every bit as rigorous as that of natural science: could *Geisteswissenschaft* (including its historical branch, *Geschichtswissenschaft*) establish itself securely on the basis of some unshakable ground, such as the transcendently secured experiences of the phenomenological subject?<sup>26</sup> In opposition to these efforts by the likes of Husserl and Dilthey, Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer set out to side-step the hegemony of modern science, engaging instead in a critical retrieval of ancient thought, embodied by Aristotle and Plato, respectively. In their view, this approach lends itself much more effectively to the human need for existential therapy, a need wholly unmet by the “progress” of modern scientific thought.

It is within this twentieth-century milieu of evaluating the role and status of modern science that Joseph Ratzinger—at this time a young presbyter working as a fundamental theologian in Regensburg—confronts what he regards as the “boundary violations” of the historical-critical

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<sup>25</sup> Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, trans. J. R. Forster and Michael J. Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000), 64.

<sup>26</sup> We see this attempt in the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, according to Gadamer: “Thus [Dilthey] set himself the task of constructing a new and more viable epistemological basis for between historical experience and the idealistic heritage of the historical school. This is the meaning of his intention to complement Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* with a critique of historical reason.” Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 219.

method of biblical interpretation (HCM).<sup>27</sup> As will be developed below, my contention regarding Ratzinger’s critical stance is twofold. First, any would-be scientific enterprise which refuses to heed the input of divine revelation must be respectfully considered but also chastened, repositioned in a role of limited competence. Not only is such secular discourse wholly unable to treat issues of existential meaning and human longing, but it is unable to secure and justify its own presumed autonomy. Second, Ratzinger’s construal of theology as a “spiritual science” which respects and indeed incorporates the findings of the now more restricted practice of secular science (including HCM), insists on the true if surprising ultimate goal of such secular inquiry: a mystical wisdom which engages the whole person—body, heart, mind, will, and affections—all in the pursuit of holiness and union with God.<sup>28</sup>

- **The pattern of “exit and return”**

Third, the recurring motif of exit and return is so prominent in Bonaventure that we are compelled to present this theme as well, here in the introduction. In his *The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition*, Andrew Louth writes:

Within the Platonic framework, the soul’s search for God is naturally conceived of as a return, an *ascent* to God; the soul properly belongs with God, and in its ascent it is but realizing its own true nature. Christianity, on the other hand, speaks of the Incarnation of God, of his *descent* into the world that he might give to man the possibility of a communion with God that is not open to him by nature. And yet man *is* made in the image of God, and so these movements of ascent and descent cross one another and remain—as a fact of experience—in unresolved tension.<sup>29</sup>

One dynamic which Louth nicely captures here is the way in which Christian theology aporetically crosses non-revealed philosophy. In this quotation above, the “exit and return” pattern heralded by the pagan tradition of Platonic philosophy—the journey of *nous* from the divine, and then back to the divine—is at first thought to collide with the apparently biblical denial, held for example by the scripturally rooted Jewish thinker Philo, of the immortality of the soul. (At this denial Louth gestures with his words “... a communion not open to [humanity] by nature.”) On this theological view, then, man cannot be said to have originated in God, and hence

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<sup>27</sup> Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, *Eschatology*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., ed. Aidan Nichols, trans. Michael Waldstein (Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 2007), 19–24.

<sup>28</sup> Vincent Twomey, “Ratzinger on Theology as Spiritual Science,” in *Entering the Mind of Christ: The True Nature of Theology*, ed. James Keating (Omaha: Institute for Priestly Formation, 2014), 47–70.

<sup>29</sup> Louth, *Origins*, 13.

any *reditus* to the divine origin is undermined. And yet, upon further reflection, when the referent of “man” or “mankind” or *anthropos* is conceived Christocentrically—Christ being the “second man and the last Adam” (Col 1:15)—the original Platonic configuration is rescued and redeemed. If, that is, Jesus Christ is the true human(ity), then we *can* indeed hold that both his—that is, humanity’s—origin and destiny are (in) God. Hence the original *pagan* picture is vindicated, even if transfigured. Christ’s divine origin (*exitus*) and divine destiny (*reditus*) are seen in the Incarnation and Ascension. The original Neoplatonic pattern is upheld, but now with a novel imaginative conception of “man” or “human” (as in “the soul of the human being”).

As Ratzinger emphasizes in his *Habilitationsschrift*, this Christocentric model of exit and return is indeed held by Bonaventure himself, and the deep logic of his *Hexaëmeron*—this much Ratzinger makes explicit—is that this *itinerarium* is accomplished not just ontologically but historically. Time and time again, as we will see below, the Seraphic Doctor stresses that “Christ is the center”—metaphysically, scripturally, but also historically. “The center of what?” one may well inquire. For the purposes of this study, the most relevant answer to this question is: the center of the journey, the journey from origin to destination.

For now I will limit my elaboration of this theme to a rather general level. In expounding Plato’s “phenomenological” description of human knowing as imaged in the Divided Line in Book VI of the *Republic*, I noted above that the middle term—*dianoia*—refers to a time-laden process which takes place between a first and last position, which in turn seem in some sense to be timeless. If we broaden the perspective from the process of human knowing to the grand sweep of biblical history, then we can say—very much in the spirit of Bonaventure—that this very time span of history is itself the “middle term” which occupies a middle position between cosmic origin in God and cosmic destination in God. What lies at the very center of this structure? The time-laden *logos* become *sarx*—the middle term which completes the movement from origin to omega point, or the journey of exit and return.

- **The philosophical importance of desire, or the existential register of affect**

To get our bearings on this fourth macro-theme of this essay, we can reflect upon two notions already dealt with above: *dianoia* and science. In the above list of elements which Aristotle counts as constituent parts of Greek tragedy, one notable item in the list is *dianoia*, or the “thought” which accompanies the tragedy’s plot (*mythos*) and which, the reader having sifted through the twists and turns of the plot’s action, comprises “the point” of the story in a relatively

abstract way—for example, in the same way that Christ’s parables can be distilled in the form of an aphorism or proverb.<sup>30</sup> One must realize, however, that *dianoia* accompanies not only the plot, but also those *affective* dimensions of the mythopoietic production, such as *pathos* and catharsis. Even for Aristotle, then, the plot cannot be fully and properly stated without some kind of emotional engagement. When Jesus narrates the parable of the prodigal son in Luke 15, any abstract statement of the point of this parable in the form of an aphorism, for example, would need to include the emotional weight of the father’s love for the son, a love illustrated in the parable by the father’s lavish acts of affection for the son, and the wildly extravagant abundance of his gifts for the son who was lost and now is found (see Luke 15:11–32).

Turning to Bonaventure, when in this essay I investigate his performance of what I characterize as *dianoia*—that is to say, his interpretation of Sacred Scripture—what I find is that for him this process of reading, of synthesizing and separating various textual elements, is far more than merely intellectual or rational. When Bonaventure leads his audience by the hand in the journey of Scripture reading,<sup>31</sup> he stresses that in so reading, our desires must be engaged and transformed. Otherwise, as we will see below, the purpose of Scripture is tragically thwarted.

To state it differently, science—a discourse in relation to which both Bonaventure and Ratzinger, as we have stated above, position themselves contrapuntally—is radically deficient, when unaccompanied by alternate forms of discourse, for the attainment of the true goal at which both Bonaventure and Ratzinger aim. While useful in its own sphere, it cannot address the deeper meaning of the human or the divine, and when it attempts to do so the result is a boundary violation. What, then, is this true goal for both thinkers? Bonaventure explicitly articulates it at the beginning of the *Hexaëmeron*, second in sequence only to the consideration of audience in *Collatio* I: he titles the second collation, “On the fullness of wisdom [*sapientia*] in which speech [*sermo*] must end.”<sup>32</sup> Throughout the body of the work, furthermore, this emphasis on Christian wisdom—the achievement of which includes the proper formation of desire—is sustained.

Such is the case as well for Bonaventure’s twentieth-century German interpreter, as Fr. Vincent Twomey shows in his article “Ratzinger on Theology as Spiritual Science,” the title of which suggests a similar regard for science as salutary but, in its “unspiritual” forms,

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<sup>30</sup> To illustrate this point, Paul Ricœur appeals to the work of New Testament scholar Joachim Jeremias on parables of Jesus in the Gospels (Ricœur, “Human Experience,” 110).

<sup>31</sup> I borrow this phraseology from Candler, *Theology and Manuduction*, cited above.

<sup>32</sup> Bonaventure, *Collations on the Six Days*, trans. José de Vinck (Patterson, New Jersey: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1970), 21.

insufficient.<sup>33</sup> If the goal is more than the conclusion to a sound argument (on the order of an Aristotelian syllogism)<sup>34</sup> or the deduction of a geometric axiom, then something more than *scientia*—both Bonaventure and Ratzinger agree—is needed. This “something more” is provided by the narrative of Scripture, the *dianoia* of which must needs avail itself of existential realities which touch upon the realm of human desire, realities which include the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. For both Christian thinkers, then, any merely scientific maturity which lacks the incorporation of these passions falls short of that full *sapientia* which is finally embodied in that ultimate moment of the intellect called the Beatific Vision, which is concomitant with full *sapientia*. If the final moment of the intellect is the grasp of the whole, then in the Beatific Vision our grasp of the whole requires in turn that “our whole”—the holistic dimensionality of the whole self—itself be grasped. My hope is that, in the details which follow below, I can show that for both thinkers the achievement of this final goal requires not just science, but also—precisely because of the necessity of affect—story.

• **History (and time) as the life-blood of theology.**

We turn now to our fifth and final introductory theme. In his *The End of Time: A Meditation on the Philosophy of History*, Joseph Pieper argues not only that all genuine philosophy stands in a contrapuntal relationship to theology, but also that this relationship holds true, more than anywhere else, in the philosophy of history. In the *logos* of history, that study in which, if possible, we attempt to grasp the meaning of history, here more than anywhere, according to Pieper, philosophy is utterly dependent upon theology. In short, Pieper thinks that, without theology, there can be no real philosophy of history.

This is the case, argues Pieper, for three reasons. First, unlike philosophy, theology claims to answer the cosmic questions of “whence” and “whither.” Second, theology alone addresses issues of disaster and salvation, issues or events which by their very nature are historical. Third and finally, the history of redemption for Pieper is “the exact center of theological pronouncement.”<sup>35</sup> To a far larger than philosophy, then, *theology* assimilates at a basic level the objects of history, objects which, for Ratzinger as for Bonaventure, irreducibly take the narrative form of the *historia salutis*.

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<sup>33</sup> Twomey, “Spiritual Science,” 47–70.

<sup>34</sup> The conclusion of a sound argument (that is, one that is valid, with premises which are all true) will always be true. See Irving M. Copley and Carl Cohen, *Introduction to Logic*, 9<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1994), 64.

<sup>35</sup> Josef Pieper, *The End of Time, a Meditation on the Philosophy of History*, trans. Michael Bullock (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1954), 19–24.

Thanks to Pieper, then, we can see that philosophy's attempt to assimilate or even assess the phenomenon of history requires yet another "discourse in between": theology. Theology's particular importance, for the purpose of this essay, is that it "sticks closer" to the narrative of history than does philosophy. In this light one can appreciate the precise nature of the rebuke Ratzinger's Bonaventure levels against Aristotelianism (be it that of the "historical Aristotle" or that of thirteenth-century Paris): by forsaking history, it forsakes theology, and by forsaking theology it forsakes the *dianoia* necessary for the end goal of human existence, "final intellect" in the fullest sense. By itself, philosophy is insufficient.

One implication with respect to time and history remains, however: if philosophy is insufficient, then so is *chronos*, philosophy's time. Indeed, in *Physics* IV we encounter the Philosopher's definition of *chronos*: an accident of motion which is measurable, neutral, and instrumental.<sup>36</sup> I stand in negative agreement with Aristotle, then: if time is mere *chronos*, then history is mere *tyché*, opaque to reason.<sup>37</sup> For Scripture, however, and hence for Bonaventure and Ratzinger, time is more than *chronos*: beyond the tick-tock of the chronometer, God's work, God's "mighty deeds" in the *historia salutis* are not assessed in the neutral measurements of the empty unit, but rather in the events of *kairos*, oversaturated phenomena, which are fraught with existential meaning. After developing this contrast between scientific *chronos* and existential *kairos*, I will show how this initial temporal difference points in the direction of others. Beyond *chronos*, *kairos* opens the door to other options as well, including the imaginative time of fictional narrative as well as the liturgical time of Christian mythopoietic ritual.

#### **IV. Descriptive Chapter Outline.**

- Chapter One: "Wise *Phonêsis*: the *Sitz im Leben* of Bonaventure and Ratzinger"

My first major move in this essay is to set the stage of each respective thinker's historical situation, in thirteenth-century Paris and twentieth-century Germany, respectively. More than a perfunctory attempt to situate each respective thinker in his original milieu, this initial chapter is motivated by a contrast between "the abstract representation of time" and "the existential interpretation of temporality."<sup>38</sup> I will spell out this distinction below, but for now I should say that the abstract representation of time—what I call below the "timeline approach"—fails to do justice or to "tell the truth" about the complex human *experience* of temporal life or lived

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<sup>36</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, trans. Joe Sachs (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1995), 217b–224a.

<sup>37</sup> I establish that for Aristotle history is *tyche*, or chance, in chapter two of this essay.

<sup>38</sup> Ricœur, "Human Experience," 108-9.

temporality, an experience closely related to Martin Heidegger's point, articulated in Division Two ("Dasein and Temporality") of *Being and Time*, about Dasein's *Sorge* (his glossed version of ancient *phronêsis*) in response to the experience of *Geworfenheit*.<sup>39</sup> This existentialist insistence on temporal authenticity in the midst of one's historical situation—an insistence shared by St. Augustine in his *Confessions*—underlines the importance of this initial chapter for the overall message of my essay. If *phronêsis*—in its ancient or postmodern guise—involves the intersection of the rational and appetitive levels of the soul, then *mythos*—also oriented to these two psychic registers—is a fitting discourse. As we see in the very lived experience of Bonaventure and Ratzinger, that is, it is *mythos* which brings about prudence in the soul, a virtue needed precisely in the fraught historical situation of each thinker.

Of note regarding the *Sitz im Leben* of Bonaventure and Ratzinger is the weight of the existential demands and decisions confronting them as a function of their respective cultural moments. In thirteenth-century Paris this took the form of carving historical a path forward into the future, under the crushing and contradictory pressure not just of the newly fashionable Aristotelian science, but also the Joachimite eschatology of "spiritual Franciscanism." In order to navigate these torrential flood waters of crisis, St. Bonaventure had no choice but to turn inward. Something similar holds for twentieth-century Bavaria: the future pontiff finds himself at the crossroads of a secular culture in which modernism and its equal and opposite naïve fideism demand a response of an unprecedented kind. For inspiration, Ratzinger draws on the example of the Seraphic Doctor.

This chapter, then, will serve not only as a biographical introduction, but also as a suggestion that for each thinker, the unique crisis of their cultural moment makes history and time foundational to his thought.

- Chapter Two: *Mythos* as *Metaxu*: Bonaventure versus Aristotle

Here I build on my initial presentation of *mythos* (above) and develop my claim that it provides a fruitful approach by which one can the grasp the deep meaning of Bonaventure's work in the *Hexaëmeron*. The force of this argument is that *mythos* or narrative provides an effective lens through which to view Bonaventure's engagement with Aristotle. To this end I argue that it is with Aristotle's configuration of the relationship among the three discourses of

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<sup>39</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 274–486.

science, story, and history that Ratzinger's Bonaventure takes issue, even if this criticism is not explicitly stated in the work of either thinker in these precise terms. In contrast to Aristotle, it is the case for both Bonaventure and Ratzinger that, in relation to science and history, *mythos* is the "discourse in between."

• Chapter Three: "Bookending Thought: the Structural position of *Intellectus*"

Having laid this groundwork, I then develop the first of the three major characteristics in the work of in each respective thinker (Bonaventure and Ratzinger) which point to or suggest the relevance of story or *mythos*. For both thinkers, a God-given initial illumination (first *intellectus*) is given *both* in the recognition of the ordinary objects of natural reason (Creation Day 1/Vision 1), as well as in that of the objects of faith (Creation Day 2/Vision 2).<sup>40</sup> Yet, this initial grasp, for both thinkers, gives rise to an arduous process of growth and development—a process which takes place *both* in the rational register of *dianoia*, or what I call "*dianoia* proper" (associated with Day 3/Vision 3), as well as in the moral and affective register of desire.<sup>41</sup> Finally, on the far side of *ratio* and desire formation (taken jointly as the process of *dianoia*), we find in the thought of both thinkers a similar end goal (Creation Day 4/Vision 4), an end goal which occupies the structural position of final intellect. While I hasten to identify this end goal quite explicitly as the Beatific Vision, part of my burden is to bring out the rich and complex texture of the presentation of the Beatific Vision on the part of both Bonaventure and Ratzinger. Ratzinger's Bonaventure articulates this climactic moment in terms of a historical democratization of mystical wisdom: that which was formerly limited to an elite circle of disciples (1 Cor 2:6) will one day be available to all (Eph 3:10). Ratzinger, too, regards this ultimate destiny of the mind to be both holistic—encompassing every dimension of the individual human being—and "corporate" or cosmic in nature. He treats it extensively in his *Eschatology*.

Speaking of Ratzinger's *Eschatology*, it is under this initial characteristic rubric of the structure of intellect that I will develop the importance of his response to the rise of the historical-critical method of biblical interpretation of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries

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<sup>40</sup> Recall that this combination of the first two "days" or "visions" into a singular, first moment of a larger, tripartite structure mirrors the same dynamic as I articulated vis-à-vis Plato's divided line (*eikasia* and *pistis*), above.

<sup>41</sup> Later in the paper, make it explicit that *the very fact that for Bon (& Ratz?) dianoia is never without (de Certeau article: "not without"?), never takes place without, the engagement of the affections*, is itself a powerful pointer to the prominence of *mythos* in each of their thought. It is precisely *in narratives*—and possibly in narratives alone—that *dianoia* is coupled with the engagement of the affect (in the reader / thinker / audience).

(HCM), a response articulated in this work dealing with “last things.” Although this issue will have implications for the relationship between history and reason (chapter 5, below) I primarily deal with it here under the rubric of the intellect because for both Bonaventure and his modern German interpreter, the core issue involved is the *role of faith*—and thus the *intellectus fidei*—in biblical studies or biblical interpretation, a discipline which, after Peter Lombard, must incorporate aspects of science. Since for Ratzinger (as indeed for Bonaventure), however, any academic treatment of the Christian Bible which, in its attempt to be rigorously scientific, excludes the role of faith—a role which Bonaventure elucidates in his exegesis of creation day two—can only ever be essentially and radially deficient, this twentieth-century debate sheds great light upon the question of the ultimate goal of the human intellect, for both thinkers. This is the case, not least, because both thinkers, properly understood, regard *dianoia* as essential to the achievement of the Beatific Vision, or the ultimate goal of the human intellect (“final intellect”). Far from denying the validity of HCM in and of itself—which, importantly for this context, takes as its starting point the supposed implausibility of the eschatologically immanent expectations of the earliest community of Jesus followers, as evidenced by the New Testament texts themselves—Ratzinger wants both to resist any *reductionism* in theology (be it in a “scientific” or a “sociological” direction),<sup>42</sup> as well as to champion—importantly for my project he does this in a way that channels of the spirit of Bonaventure—theology as a *spiritual* science. This latter emphasis, in turn, amounts to an insistence on a kind of holistic *sapientia*, by definition beyond the scope of any modern, secular domain, as the final goal of the human intellect. As I have suggested above, such *sapientia* is part-and-parcel with final *intellectus* for each respective thinker.

How does this structure of the intellect point to the notion of story or narrative? Invoking Paul Ricœur’s narrative analysis, in particular his development of the idea of the “second reading,” I will identify the first *intellectus* with the pre-given glimpse of a story (for example, the genre), the process of *dianoia* with the process of reading, and the second *intellectus* with the final grasp of the whole, which then allows one to conduct the process of reading the story all over again, in new and fresh ways. When the reader reads a story, she enacts the hermeneutical

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<sup>42</sup> For Ratzinger, biblical studies is organically of one piece with theology, and cannot legitimately be severed from it.

circle (a notion shared by Ricoeur and Gadamer), which is to say that she passes through every stage of the intellect: first *intellectus*, *dianoia*, and final *intellectus*.

- Chapter 4: “The Man of Desires and the Necessity of Affect”

In addition to the shared presupposition of the above articulated structure of the intellect, both thinkers insist on the necessity of “dealing with desire” for true human fulfillment, which is concomitant with final *intellectus*. In the case of Bonaventure this requirement is seen (among other ways) in his “monastic” (as opposed to “scholastic”) style of “writing.”<sup>43</sup> In the work of the then-future pontiff, the necessity of desire manifests itself in his consistent exaltation of the primacy of love in the Christian life. Such affective discourse cannot be reduced to the one-dimensional level embodied in HCM, or indeed by the secular attempt to flatten out the historic doctrine of the resurrection of the dead to the mere affirmation of the modernistic catholic concept, ironically initiated by Luther, of “resurrection in death.”

Connecting this motif of desire to that of narrative or story, I appeal once again to C. S. Lewis’ essay *Myth Become Fact*. Since full Christian *sapientia*—for both thinkers tantamount to the *telos* of the human life—involves the transformation and sanctification of the whole person, no account of the Christian *perigrinatio*—be it individual, corporate, or cosmic—can neglect the role of story or *mythos*. For it is in and through the exposure to poetic elements such as plot, heroism, sacrifice, *pathos*, and catharsis that our desires are summoned, kindled, and transformed by God. Such, at any rate, is the view of the Seraphic Doctor as well as the Bavarian presbyter-theologian.

- Chapter 5: “Seeds of *Geschichte*: the Rational Discernment of History”

Third and finally, the theme most centrally at issue in this essay is the mutual interpenetration, in the work of each respective thinker, of history (which necessarily includes time) and human thought. Here in chapter five a host of issues will be unpacked to show the full extent to which both thinkers regard history and mind as mutually interpenetrated. For now, I will merely introduce a sample of the main ways in which each thinker goes about doing this.

For Bonaventure’s part, one should attend primarily to the five “passes” at, or iterations of, the crosspollination of history with formal structure (be it in the historicization of human thought,

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<sup>43</sup> On this distinction, see Jean Leclercq, *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God*. The reason I put the word “writing” in quotation marks is that the *Collationes in Hexaëmeron* as we have them were originally given as something like a series of sermons, which were then written down and organized by a collator, as one can gather from the epilogue to the Quarrachi edition. Bonaventure, *Collations on the Six Days*, 381–2.

or the inverse of this, this discernment of an intelligible structure within history or temporal occurrence):

1. **The step-wise development of intellect in the six days of creation of Gen 1.**

Bonaventure's treatment of the days of creation provides the macro-structure of the entire *Hexaëmeron*, and coordinates God's work of creation on each particular day (work which I will claim takes place in the *imaginary time* of *mythos*) with the respective stages of the intellect, the moments elaborated in Plato's Line. His account begins with the intellect of both natural reason and faith (days one and two), passes through the *dianoetic* process of biblical interpretation (day three), and culminates with the fourth day's symbolic presentation of the full and final human destiny. Here, Bonaventure seems to suggest, a historical narrative is created by the original biblical "author" in order to account for the workings of the mind. In Bonaventure's treatment of the days of creation, then, we find a logical priority on mind, a reality upon which the historical text depends. History, that it, depends upon (the structure of) mind. Here, history is mindful.

2. **The progression inherent in the one-to-one correspondence of the Old Testament (or the Old Covenant) to the New Testament (or the New Covenant in Christ).**

Bonaventure takes over this logic of binary relationship, logical *and* historical in nature, from Joachim of Fiore and others, and from it generates multiple sets of one-to-one correspondences, as we will see. The upshot of this move, which is fueled by Bonaventure's invention of the *multiformes theoriae* (crucial for Ratzinger's notion of revelation and for my notion of genealogical *Geschichte*), is not only that it rejects Joachim's tripartite periodization of eschatological history, but it also locates the "time of the multiplication of religious orders" in the *penultimate* epoch of eschatological history. What we find here in Bonaventure's construal of the relationship between the testaments is a logical priority on history: a historical development—the fulfillment of the Old Covenant in the New Covenant of Christ—serves as a constitutive element for human thought. Here mind depends on history. Mind is historical.

3. **The development of the scriptural notion of the *semen* of "Day Three" (Gen 1:11–12) into a genealogical account of the development of doctrine.** This account of the development of doctrine can then in turn be expanded to encompass a full-blown theory

of historical development, founded on the basis of historically progressive interpretations of Scripture.<sup>44</sup>

Here, in a way which incorporates the first two iterations above, history and mind mutually constitute each other. Bonaventure clearly thinks that subsequent interpretations of Scripture will drive historical developments and vice versa. Mind is historical *and* history is mindful.

4. **The historicization of the celestial hierarchies of Pseudo-Dionysius.** Although Denys himself holds that the ecclesial hierarchy of the church does make manifest the heavenly hierarchy of the divine realm, Bonaventure's contribution here is that he lays this relationship bare, making explicit the historically progressive constitution of the church, which for him "*in tempore nascitur et procedit.*"<sup>45</sup>
5. **The historicization of Dionysian *sapientia nulliformis*.** Here Bonaventure hauntingly identifies a rather obscure character from St. John's Apocalypse—"the *angelus ab ortu solis*" of Rev 7:2—with the (for him, beloved) historical figure of St. Francis of Assisi. It is here that we see not just an additional "logicization" of history, but also an *affirmation* of a key strain of Joachimism: the historical inbreaking into the "here and now" of an apocalyptically fraught reality. And yet, due in part to the practical needs of his monastic order, Joachim does not have the last word.

In each of these last two renditions, we find a logical priority on mind—the thought of the Areopagite—which then gets written into history. History, here, is mindful.

The Seraphic Doctor has much more to say in his imaginative commentary on Genesis 1, but these five moves capture its import for the issue of the mutually constitutive relationship between history and thought.

When it comes to this interpenetration of rationality and temporality, Ratzinger also has much to contribute. First, he draws out and develops in his *Habilitationsschrift* the problem of Joachim and Franciscan spiritualism, a crisis over the correct interpretation of history. Next, he situates Bonaventure's eschatology within the larger medieval horizon of meaning which makes it possible (providing its "condition of possibility") in the first place. This genealogical approach

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<sup>44</sup> A genealogical account of this kind is precisely what we find in Part One of Ratzinger's *Introduction to Christianity* (Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 103–90).

<sup>45</sup> Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, XXII.3. Citations of the *Collationes in Hexaëmeron* are from the standard Quaracchi edition (*Doctoris seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*; Quaracchi, 1882–1902), V:329–449.

is, I claim, a kind of “meshing together” of history and reason, close to Bonaventure’s moves in the context of day three. He then treats Bonaventure’s invention of the *multiformes theoriae* so as to suggest a view of history that is explicitly dynamic and progressive, conditioned and shaped by intellectual developments. Further, in the budding Bavarian theologian’s treatment of Bonaventure which was excised from the edition which was actually accepted by his *Habilitation* committee and actually published (in 1959), Ratzinger offers an innovative interpretation of Bonaventure’s concept of *revelatio*, which for me is most valuable for its provision of the condition of possibility, on *theological* grounds, for conceiving of history in terms of genealogy and *Geschichte*, a view which regards history as thoroughly and irreducibly conditioned by human conceptuality. Finally, his most thought-provoking contribution in the *Habilitationsarbeit* is his pin-pointing of *the nature of time* as the ultimate ground, the most basic objection, which Bonaventure levels against Aristotle and the Aristotelianism of his day. Ratzinger’s Bonaventure is unable to accept Aristotle’s relegation of history to the realm of the irrational. As a “discourse in between,” narrative allows Ratzinger’s Bonaventure to redeem the historical, recasting it as a story written not just by human beings, but also by a providential God.

Beyond the *Habilitationsschrift*, Ratzinger offers a rendition, in his *Introduction to Christianity*, of the historical development of the (now) orthodox thinking about God—the semantic range and intellectual context surrounding the term “God”—which can be called genealogical and mythopoetic (though, as we will see, for him the *proper* use of demythologization is crucial). In his *Eschatology*, further, he performs a genealogy of the emergence and eventual dominance of HCM, which originates with Martin Luther as an “inaugurating rupture” within a wholly new intellectual tradition, thus demonstrating what this distinctively modern dispute really is: a case study which sheds light on the larger issue of *tradition*, an issue which is, as Ratzinger is at pains to stress, the true heart and motivation of his theological work. At this point in my essay, my hermeneutical posture, informed here by both Gadamer and Ricœur, again becomes relevant, since it is nothing other than tradition, I will argue, which constitutes the condition of the possibility of the initial moment (first *intellectus*) of the reading of history—for example, the *historia salutis* as presented in the Christian Bible—as story.

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What I attempt to do in this essay, then, after situating each thinker in his historical context and introducing the role of *mythos*, is to examine the above three myth-related characteristics (the structural resonance of *mythos* with the intellect, ch. 3; its unique ability to make contact with the human register of desire, ch. 4; its provision of the rationale of history, ch. 5) which emerge in the texts themselves of the two respective thinkers. I hope to utilize these three characteristics, together with the metaxological position of *mythos* (ch. 2) to show that philosophy is dependent upon theology in important ways, having to do with history and its presuppositions about *mythos* and temporality.

Allow me to frame my project in one final way. When I was a Masters of Divinity student in the late 1990s and early 2000s at Westminster Theological Seminary, I was taught to exegete any given biblical passage by situating it within successive levels of context: the immediate textual unit in which it appears, the respective, particular “book” of the Bible, the applicable section of the canon (the Pentateuch, the Wisdom Literature, the “catholic epistles,” etc.), the New Testament or Old Testament/Hebrew Bible, and lastly the final level of the entire canon of Christian Scripture.

In this essay I am attempting to do something similar. In *Collatio XXIII*, near the end of the *Hexaëmeron*, one encounters the arresting statement that God’s eschatological work of salvation, including (among other elements) the “[glorification] of body and soul,” is intended to result, in the lives of God’s people, in their “[inebriation] by heavenly dew.”<sup>46</sup> What is the significance of this provocative statement? It is this question which I attempt to answer, through successive levels of context, in this essay.

To the larger argument, then, let us now turn.